

HOW ADEQUATE IS FAY AND MOON'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES?

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Abstract. In *What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?* Brian Fay and Donald Moon rejected the two traditional approaches in philosophy of social sciences such as the humanism and the naturalism. The rejection was based on the claim that these two approaches are narrow and one-sided. Fay and Moon then argue that an adequate philosophy of social sciences must be a synthesis of the two approaches. For them, this hybrid position is capable of meeting the requirements for adequacy for philosophy of social sciences. Contrary to Fay and Moon's view, this article argues that their suggested monistic approach is not as adequate as they believe it to be. One of the reasons is that the term "adequacy" has been subjected to several interpretations by scholars in the time past. But what is the sense of "adequacy" here? The paper also argues that though the new approach helps us to overcome the problem of one-sidedness faced by humanism and naturalism, however, it is not flawless due to certain constraints such as "the problem of identity" and "the failure argument". The paper concludes that Fay and Moon's requirements for adequacy are not sufficient conditions for adequate philosophy of social sciences.

Keywords: Humanism, Naturalism, Adequacy, Philosophy, Social sciences

Introduction

One of the major controversies arising from the nature of social sciences is the controversy about the appropriate methodology for the study of man (human beings), human behaviour and other social phenomena. From historical trace, what led to this controversy was the debate about the scientific status of social sciences arising from the way it is often being compared with the natural sciences.

In an attempt to examine this crucial controversy about the nature of social sciences, different important positions or schools of thought were advanced by scholars. Namely; the humanist's school and the naturalist's school. These two traditional positions according to Brian Fay and Donald Moon have dominated discussions in Philosophy of social sciences

for years.¹ However, from Fay and Moon's assessment, these traditional dualistic positions are not capable of delivery to us what an adequate philosophy of social science ought to be.

In *What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?* Fay and Moon posed three important questions that an adequate account of social sciences must answer. The questions are; first, what is the relationship between interpretation and explanation in social science? Second, what is the nature of social scientific theory? The third, what is the role of critique in social science? As far as Fay and Moon are concerned, neither humanism nor naturalism can answer these three questions individually. Instead, they defended a monistic position which is a synthesis of the humanism and naturalism. They presented it as an alternative position that is capable of addressing these three fundamental questions above.

For clarity's sake, the position of Fay and Moon can be summarised with the following two arguments;

Argument I

Premise 1. An approach will be an adequate approach in social science if and only if such an approach is capable of answering the three questions that the idea of a social science raises.

Premise 2. Neither humanism nor naturalism can answer these three questions.

Therefore, neither humanism nor naturalism is an adequate philosophy of social science.

Argument II

Premise 1. An approach will be an adequate approach in social science if and only if such an approach is capable of answering the three questions that the idea of a social science raises.

Premise 2. A monistic/hybrid approach which is a synthesis of humanism and naturalism is capable of answering these three questions.

Therefore, A monistic/hybrid approach which is a synthesis of humanism and naturalism can provide an adequate account of the philosophy of social science.

1 Brian Fay and Donald Moon, "What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?" in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 7(1977):209

With this background, our intention in this paper is to challenge and critically assess the above arguments by Fay and Moon. One quick important question is that; are Fay and Moon really correct with the claim that this new synthesis they defended is capable of answering the above three questions? If the new synthesis is capable of answering these questions, can it answer the questions satisfactorily? The emphasis here is on the word “satisfactorily” because it is not impossible to answer a question in an unsatisfactory manner. These questions shall define the focus of this paper.

The paper is divided into five main sections. Section one considers what makes social science philosophical. Section two focuses on humanist’s approach in social sciences. Meanwhile, section three considers naturalist’s approach in social sciences. Section four considers Fay and Moon suggested hybrid (synthesis of humanism and naturalism) approach. Meanwhile, the last section critically examines Fay and Moon’s arguments. Now, a question may be asked by non-philosophers that “why philosophy of social science?” or “what makes social science a candidate for philosophical consideration?” Let us begin the paper with the consideration of this question to clear this possible doubt.

Interrogating the Nexus between Philosophy and Social Sciences

As hinted above, it is fitting to start the paper of this nature by considering some helpful important questions such as; what makes social sciences candidates for philosophical consideration? What gave philosophers the gut to speak about social sciences? Or what makes philosophers think that they can say something about social sciences?

There is a quick and natural response to the above questions and the answer is not as complex as people think. Essentially, an attempt to answer this question gives birth to another question. The question is; does a mother have any right to guide her child(ren)? We return a positive answer. In that case, natural sciences, social sciences and other disciplines are candidates for philosophical consideration. Historically, it has been established that philosophy did not just give birth to but also nurtures all disciplines of studies. Similarly, given the general understanding of the different conceptions of the relationship between philosophy and other

sciences or disciplines, two conceptions will be instrumental for us in this paper. Namely; The under-labourer conception² and the master- scientist conception³. As far as Ted Benton is concerned,

The under-labourer conception gives the philosopher a very modest role. The humble task of the philosopher is to clear away some obstacles to make way for science to progress. But what are these obstacles? Primarily, the rubbish which must be removed consists of 'learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, concepts, introduced into the sciences.... such terms hinder the advance of science because they pass for genuine knowledge, while in reality covering up ignorance. (Benton, 1977:4).

Thus, the job of philosophy is to clear up conceptual confusion and to lay down standards of intelligibility, scientific status and validity. (Benton, 1977:12).

Meanwhile for the master-scientist conception,

The role of philosophy is in the enterprise of constructing-or, rather, reconstructing- the whole of (acceptable) human knowledge into one massive logically connected and internally consistent system of propositions. As with the under-labourer, the task of philosopher is in sceptical doubt concerning the adequacy of claims to knowledge. (Benton, 1977:6).

From the above, it is obvious that Fay and Moon actually employed the latter conception in order to reconstruct how and what an adequate philosophy of social science ought to look like. As Pius Alozie rightly argues, every human endeavour or pursuit has a philosophy guiding it. Since philosophy is essentially a cognitive, critical and reflective enterprise aimed at problem solving, we think that every subject has its own philosophy. There is thus, the philosophy of science, of physics, of biology, of law, of history, of arts etc. (Alozie, 1991:25). To indicate the presence of philosophy in every branch of knowledge, Leo Ochulor argues that

The Ph.D. degree awarded in all branches of human learning is called Philosophy Doctor of the discipline in question. In Ph.D.,

2 The old idea in philosophy as under-labourer, clearing away the muddles. This view is attributed to philosopher such as John Locke

3 This view is attributed to scholars such as Leibniz, Spinoza and Rene Descartes

the Ph represents Philosophy while the D represents Doctor. The Ph.D. holder in Physics is a Philosophy Doctor of Physics. The Ph.D. holder in Geography is a Philosophy Doctor of Geography. A Ph.D. holder in Medicine is a Philosophy Doctor of Medicine. (Ochulor, 2011:283)

Similarly, Sven Hanssen then drew the conclusion that Philosophy is then regarded as a form of protoscience, out of which sciences are developed. (Hansson, 2008:473). Arising from the above views, the question “What gave philosophers the gut to speak about social sciences?” has been answered. To corroborate this view, Peter Winch rightly argues on the connection between philosophy and social sciences. According to Winch, “to be clear about the nature of philosophy and to be clear about the nature of the social sciences amount to the same thing. For any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character”. (Winch, 1958:1). Let us now turn to the next section to consider the humanist’ and the naturalist’ positions in social sciences so as not to derail from our original purpose.

Humanism in Social Sciences

According to Fay and Moon, humanism is a position in social sciences which holds that social life cannot adequately be studied ‘scientifically’. (Fay and Moon, 1977:209). Humanists or the interpretive theorists claim that naturalists fail to recognize human intentionality, motives, social context, and people’s ability to change. They believe that the social world and hence social sciences are not like the natural sciences. (Ralston, 2006:199) Thus, a radically different methodology that is suitable for social world is needed.

In Ted Benton’s elaborate analysis,

The most fundamental denials of the positivist characterisation of the relation between philosophy and social sciences have had their roots in an insistence that the objects of study of the *natural sciences* and *social ‘studies’* are so utterly different that they require fundamentally different methods and form of explanation and understanding. I call these conceptions ‘humanist’... because they rest on the attribution of distinctive characteristics to human beings and their social relationships. (Benton, 1977:12).

Interpretatively, the argument here is that different methodological approaches are inevitable in both natural sciences and social sciences. The reason is that the objects of study in social sciences are social phenomena and human beings whose actions are purposive and capable of pretence unlike in the natural sciences where the objects of study are not purposive, determinable and uniform in character. As far as Benton is concerned, it is this distinctive human characteristic that demands a fundamental different approach on the part of the investigator. (Benton, 1977:12). R. G. Collingwood is also another scholar who defended humanism as the right approach for social inquiry. According to Collingwood, for science, the event is discovered by perceiving it, and further search for its cause is conducted by assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others. For history (social science), the object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed in it. (Collingwood, 1966:214).

It is obvious that the naturalists on the other side will not accept the need for separate approaches. However, the question that comes to mind is that ‘can the naturalists deny the obvious fact that the object of studies in the two sciences are different?’ I do not think so. Let us now move to the next section in order to understand the naturalists’ arguments.

Naturalism in Social Sciences

For Fay and Moon, naturalism is a position in social sciences which holds that social science involves no essential difference from the natural science. (Fay and Moon, 1977:209). Naturalists, who take their name from the natural sciences and the study of the natural world, believe that we can know the social world in basically the same way as we do in the natural sciences. (Ralston, 2006:197). The argument is that there is a reality to be known independent of the knower, and this reality can be verified through observation and measurement. (Nielson, 1990: 56). Thus, the same methodology of the natural sciences can be employed to explain social phenomena.

This view is akin to the positivists’ notion of unity of science. As Ted Bento opines, “In the name of unity of science, positivists have identified the task of capturing this domain as a matter of applying methods of

investigation, forms of explanation and standards of proof already established in the physical sciences to this new field (social sciences)”.(Benton, 1977:81). In order to establish the claim that there is no essential difference between the natural science and social sciences, Richard S. Rudner argues that,

To claim that there is a difference in methodology between two disciplines or two types of disciplines is, by contrast, to make a very radical claim. For the methodology of a scientific discipline is not a matter of its transient techniques but of its logic of justification... accordingly, to hold that the social sciences are methodologically distinct from the non-social sciences is to hold not merely the banal view that the social sciences employ different techniques of inquiry, but rather the startling view that the social sciences require a different logic of inquiry. To hold such a view, moreover, is to deny that all of science is characterized by a common logic of justification in its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories. (Rudner, 1966:5).

The above view represents an argument against the humanists’ position that clamours for separate methodologies in natural sciences and social sciences. Rudner concluded with the claim that “The view that the social sciences are methodologically distinct has sometimes been fallaciously put forward by arguments that confuse not only the notions of technique and method but also the notions discovery and validation”. (Rudner, 1966:6). One of the differences between the naturalist and the humanist ought to be made at this point. While the humanist is concerned with interpretation of social phenomena, the naturalist focuses on explanation of social phenomena. Now, having briefly considered the naturalist’s and the humanist’s positions in social sciences, let us move to the next section to consider how and why Fay and Moon defended a synthesis of the two approaches.

The Synthesised Approach: Fay and Moon’s new Synthesis

Fay and Moon posed these three important questions that any compelling account or an adequate approach in social sciences must answered. These questions formed the requirements for adequacy.

The requirements/questions for adequacy are:

Q.1. what is the relationship between interpretation and explanation in social science?⁴

Q.2. what is the nature of social scientific theory?⁵

Q.3. the third requirement is about the role of critique in social sciences. That is, what is the role of critique in social science?⁶

Explanation on Q1; in explaining this question, Fay and Moon argue that “due to the conjunction of two important features of social sciences which are; first, these sciences are *social*, and these sciences are *sciences*” (Fay and Moon, 1977:227), interpretations and explanations are required in social sciences. In other words, given the complex nature of the social phenomena and object of study in social science, any compelling account in social science must be able to combine interpretation with explanation.

The argument from the above is that since it is believed that human actions are purposive, the humanists mainly rely on people’s intentions to interpret social phenomena. Meanwhile, the naturalists engage in explanation of social phenomena with the help of established natural scientific theories. But, an adequate account of social sciences needs to bring explanation and interpretation together in a workable synthesis. One problem that Fay and Moon have with humanist and naturalist is that they are both one-sided in addressing Q1. Whereas, a more comprehensive approach is needed.

Explanation on Q2; Q.2 is about the nature of social scientific theory. The position and the usual mood of the humanist and the naturalist about the role of social scientific theory is so clear. While the naturalists argue in defence of the need for theory in social sciences, the humanists do not subscribe to the idea of a theory. In fact, the latter do not see any need for social scientific theory because it is believed that social phenomena

4 This question will be written as **Q1** henceforth in this paper. See Brian Fay and Donald Moon, “What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?” in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 7(1977):209

5 This question will be written as **Q.2** hence forth in the paper. See Brian Fay and Donald Moon, “What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?” in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 7(1977):209

6 This question will be written as **Q.3** henceforth in the paper. See Brian Fay and Donald Moon, “What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?” in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 7(1977):209

can be interpreted without any recourse to theory. Meanwhile, the naturalists' idea of championing the need for theory is quite understandable. The point is that the naturalists not only need, but also rely on theories in order to explain social phenomena. But one question that comes to mind is that given the nature of natural phenomena, does a social scientist naturalist have what it takes to apply theories like natural scientist naturalist? This is a controversial one.

Now, the argument of Fay and Moon is that given the nature of social phenomena, at some point, social scientific theory may be needed to explain social phenomena, and at another situation, mere interpretation may be needed without any need for theory. Thus, one problem that Fay and Moon identified with humanist and naturalist is that they are both one-sided in addressing Q2 as well just like in Q1. Whereas, an adequate and a compelling account of social sciences must appeal to the two approaches.

Explanation on Q3: This third requirement is mainly about the role of critique in social sciences. The problem here according to Fay and Moon is that "The humanist cannot appreciate the role of critique in social science because he artificially confines himself to interpreting the meaning which various aspects of social life are supposed to have... by so confining himself, he deprives himself of the means necessary to understand these phenomena".⁷ The problem here is that the humanist neglected the need for explanation for better understanding of social phenomena by solely relying on intention for interpretation. But the truth is that there are more to social phenomena than intentional phenomena. Meanwhile, for Fay and Moon, the naturalist, on the other hand, cannot give an account of critique because by neglecting the particular features of intentional phenomena, he cannot appreciate the crucial role which rationality plays in social life, or its assessment plays in social science. (Fay and Moon, 1977: 227).

Thus, Fay and Moon's submission is that the inadequacies of both the humanist model and the naturalist model in elucidating the role of critique in social theory give a third reason why the dualist approach must be overcome. (Fay and Moon, 1977:226).

7 Brian Fay and Donald Moon, "What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?" in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 7(1977): 226.

Humanism and the Requirements for Adequacy: The question here is that can the humanist meet the requirements for adequacy? Fay and Moon supplied a negative answer. The reason is that this approach is one-sided. (Fay and Moon, 227). This model faces similar problem with the naturalist model. The reason why this model failed to meet the requirements for adequacy is simply because it mainly focuses on one aspect of social reality without taking the other aspect into consideration.

Naturalism and the Requirements for Adequacy: The question here is that can naturalism meet the requirements for adequacy? The answer for Fay and Moon is that it did not meet the requirement. The same reason for humanism was also advanced for naturalism. The reason is that this approach is one-sided. (Fay and Moon, 227). In other words, the problem with this model is that it mainly focuses on a single aspect of social phenomena without paying attention to the other aspect of social reality.

The Synthesised approach and the Requirements for Adequacy: The very first question that comes to mind here is that does this new approach have what it takes to meet the requirements for adequacy? Fay and Moon return a positive answer. For the duo, this approach is capable of meeting the requirements for adequacy for the following reasons. (i) This approach is not one-sided like the other two (ii) this approach can answer the three fundamental questions that science of man raises that the earlier traditional dualist approach could not answer.

The point in essence is that unlike the other two approaches that failed because they fasten on only one of these features, humanism and naturalism, this synthesised approach had already taken care of such problem. The argument is that an adequate philosophy of social sciences must combine the features/elements of both humanism and naturalism. These two features must be synthesised in a single whole to form a formidable alternative position that will be able to weather the storm that both the naturalist and humanist could not weather individually. However, can this approach capture social reality better than the way each of the dualistic approach will do individually? Answers to these questions shall be attempted in the next section.

A Critical Assessment of Fay and Moon's Monistic Approach

Is the synthesised model defended by Fay and Moon adequate as a compelling account of social sciences? We return a negative answer because there are several sorts of worry about this move. These constraints are discussed in this section.

The 'Three Questions' Argument

Does answering the three questions identified above guarantee adequacy? Fay and Moon return a positive response. In fact, their central claim in "What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?" is that an adequate account/ model in philosophy of social sciences must be able to answer the three questions identified in this paper. Now, arising from this claim, some important questions must be clarified; first, are Fay and Moon really correct with this claim? Why these three questions? What makes these three questions the hallmark or the most important questions that any adequate theory of social sciences must address? What makes the questions right kind of questions? All these questions require clarifications.

Contrary to Fay and Moon's claim, we argue that apart from Q.1 which is the question about the relationship between interpretation and explanation in social science, Q.2 which is the question about the nature of social scientific theory, and Q.3 which is a question about the role of critique in social sciences, there is another essential question that must be addressed by any compelling account of social sciences. The argument is that these requirements/questions are necessary but not sufficient. The additional requirement/question is;

What justification is there in employing a particular methodology? Let us call this Q.4. This is a question about justification of a particular methodology being employed. In other words, the question is that why that particular methodology and not another? Why is this question essential for any promising account in social sciences? What makes this question intellectually important is that one of the major sources of controversy in social sciences is the debate over methodology. As Ian Jarvie rightly argues on the first page of *The Sage Handbook of The Philosophy of Social Sciences*, "the philosophical problems of the social sciences are Paradigms, *Methodology* and *Ontology*" (Jarvie, 2011:1). Thus, like the other three questions, any adequate philosophy of social science must be

able to address the question about justification of methodology employed in social inquiry. In other words, Q.1, Q.2 and Q.3 are not sufficient standards for evaluating adequacy. In essence, the essential questions in philosophy of social sciences should be Q.1, Q.2, Q.3 and Q.4.

The Adequacy Argument

The argument here is not parallel to the previous one. Considering Fay and Moon’s claim that an adequate philosophy of social science must be (capable of answering the three questions that we have discussed, let us import *argument II* from the introduction above for a proper summary of the claim.

Premise1. An approach will be an adequate approach in social sciences if and only if such an approach is capable of answering the three questions that the idea of a social science raises.

Premise 2. A monistic approach which is a synthesis of humanism and naturalism approaches is capable of answering these three questions

Therefore, A monistic approach which is a synthesis of humanism and naturalism approaches can provide an adequate philosophy of social sciences.

The emphasis here is on the word “adequacy”. The problem is that what is Fay and Moon standard for measuring adequacy? As far as they are concerned from the above argument, “capability” presupposes “adequacy” (Fay and Moon,227). In other words, to be adequate means to be capable. But, does capability really defines adequacy in all cases? This view is contestable because the problem is partly conceptual. In *Truth, Meaning, and Experience*, Anil Gupta distinguishes a whole host of interpretations that have been given to the term ‘adequacy’. First interpretation was called *Extensional adequacy* (Gupta, 2011:61), second; *intentional adequacy* (Gupta, 62) and third; *sense-adequacy*. (Gupta, 62) The extensional adequacy is about necessary condition for adequacy, the intentional adequacy requires a sufficient condition for adequacy. Meanwhile, the sense-adequacy requires both necessary and sufficient conditions for adequacy. The problem now is that what sense of adequacy is being used here by Fay and Moon? Fay and Moon failed to specify and clarify this.

Similarly, it is not clear whether this new synthesis can account for necessary and unseen facts of social reality. As Theodore Schatzki had

rightly argued, “The question, “What is the basic nature of social reality?”, is an abstract ontological question”. (Schatzki, 1988)239). Starting with Q.1, can the relationship between interpretation and explanation provide a satisfactory account for necessary and unseen facts of social reality? With Q.2, how can we use theory to identify necessary and unseen facts of social reality? And with Q.3, what will be the role of critique in explaining necessary and unseen facts of social reality? Fay and Moon need to show to us how why they think their new approach will address the question of unseen facts of social reality. Failure to take care of this shows that their approach is not as adequate as they claim. Still on the question of adequacy, Van Frassen argues that A “theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model”. (Frassen, 1980:64). The problem here is that the Fay and Moon’s new synthesised approach is not the same or similar in structure with any other approach and that will lead us to the question of identity that shall be discussed in a short while.

Discharging the Failure Argument against Humanist and the Naturalist

The argument here is that the humanists and naturalists will neither accept the failure argument that Fay and Moon attributed to their positions nor will they appreciate the move that their positions should be reduced to one synthesised model. The challenge here is that we need clarification to establish whether the humanist and naturalist on the one hand, and Fay and Moon on the other hand are addressing the same question. From literatures available, it is not established that the humanist, the naturalist and Fay and Moon are responding to the same questions. The humanists and the naturalists are responding to the questions about the nature and appropriate methodology for social sciences, (Fay and Moon, 209), meanwhile, Fay and Moon are responding to the questions about the requirements for an adequate philosophy of social sciences. (Fay and Moon, 209). It is obvious that these are not the same questions. Just as it will be wrong for a physician to treat different patients with different ailments that require different treatments the same way, it will also be wrong for Fay and Moon to accuse humanist and naturalist that they have failed because the questions they are addressing are not the same and as a result, the standard of assessment ought not to be the same. Thus, the failure objection against

humanist and the naturalist could be dismissed naturally.

The Identity Problem

Similarly, another worry with this synthesised approach that Fay and Moon failed to address is the problem about the nature and identity of this new synthesis. The challenge is that with this new approach, would social sciences still be “scientific” in the same way that the natural sciences are? If the answer is yes, the worry is that what happens to the humanist’s elements/features in this model? And if the answer is no, what then is the identity of this new synthesis given its humanistic and naturalistic commitment? These questions are germane because; (i) Fay and Moon failed to tell us what the identity of this approach will be, (ii) we need to know what will be the role of intention, motive action and meaning that the humanist defended. Arising from the point (i) above, will the new hybrid approach be a genuinely distinct approach? Or will it appear as a naturalist approach at one time since the naturalist argues that they share the same methodology with the natural sciences, and appear as the humanist position at another? What motivated these questions is the obvious fact that the factors that the new synthesis appeal to will be some combination of both humanism features and naturalism features. The failure to provide sufficient explanation on this is worrisome.

Also, Fay and Moon failed to explain how this new approach will be able to accommodate the possibility of clash between the two synthesised approaches. We should be reminded that Fay and Moon had earlier argued that social phenomena require both interpretation (humanism feature) and explanation (naturalism feature). It is equally noteworthy that the general attempt to balance interpretation with explanation may not always be practicable. This is due to the fact that there are instances when interpretation and explanation will be in conflict especially with this new synthesis. Now the question is that in case of clash between explanation and interpretation in social sciences, how would this approach address this possible problem? Thus, it is not clear whether this reconciliatory approach will always be successful.

On the positive side, if Fay and Moon attempt to combine both the naturalist’ and the humanist’ approaches in the same workable synthesis to form a new approach is as successful as they claim, then the following implications hold (i) there is no factual disagreement between the two

approaches, (ii) the gap that scholars claim that exists between the two approaches is not as wide as they claim. However, this does not remove the fact that this new approach is not also problem free.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have been able to establish that Fay and Moon's suggested approach is not as adequate as they claim. The reason is that there are more to an adequate account of social sciences beyond the three questions identified above. The paper concludes that though the requirements for the monistic/hybrid approach are necessary, they are not sufficient in providing an adequate account of the philosophy of social sciences.

In "What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?" Fay and Moon had assisted us to understand the nature of social sciences better. Also, they also identified the failure of the dualist approach in meeting the requirements for adequacy in philosophy of social sciences. Similarly, the attempt to present a compelling account of social phenomena led to their suggested synthesised alternative approach. However, though, this new synthesis had helped us to overcome the problem of one-sidedness faced by humanism and naturalism. Yet, there are several problems and unanswered questions about this new monistic approach that call for worry too.

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